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Motivation and objectives
Motivation
US cities, counties, and states spend substantial resources on subsidies trying to attract rms from
other locations
The annual costs of such subsidies range from $33.4m in Nevada to $19.1bn in Texas and total $80.4bn
nationwide
Objectives
Understand what motivates regional governments to subsidize rm relocations and quantify how strong
their incentives are
Characterize fully non-cooperative and cooperative subsidy choices and assess how far away we are
from these extremes
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Approach and ndings
Approach
I pursue these objectives in the context of a quantitative economic geography model which I calibrate
to US states
I calculate optimal subsides, Nash subsidies, and cooperative subsidies and compare them to observed
subsidies
Findings
I show that states have strong incentives to subsidize rm relocations in order to gain at the expense
of other states
Observed subsidies are closer to cooperative than non-cooperative subsidies but the potential losses
from an escalation of subsidy competition are large
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Key model features
In my model, the location of economic activity is determined by a combination of rst and
second advantages
It emphasizes agglomeration forces in the New Economic Geography tradition but is isomorphic
to one with external IRS
It can be calibrated to the US economy using data on internal trade ows, subsidies, and the
distribution of workers alone
I make many simplications in the interest of transparency so that my numbers have to be
interpreted with a grain of salt
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Contribution
I am not aware of any comparable analysis of noncooperative and cooperative policy in a
spatial environment
Theoretical work such as Baldwin et al (2005) restricts attention to highly stylized models
whereas I connect to data
Quantitative work such as Gaubert (2014) and Serrato and Zidar (2014) takes policy as given
whereas I endogenize it
Methodologically most similar are the recent contributions by Ossa (2014), Redding (2014),
and Caliendo et al (2014)
My modeling of agglomeration forces builds on Krugman (1991), Krugman and Venables
(1995), and Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
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Outline
Framework
Calibration
Analysis
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Setup - Preferences
Preferences are common over goods and heterogeneous over amenities:
Ujv = Uj exp (ajv )
Uj = Aj
C Fj
Lj
C Fj =
 
∑
i
Z Mi
0
cFij (ωi )
ε 1
ε dωi
! ε
ε 1
ajv  Gumbel (0, σ)
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Setup - Technology
Firms use labor, capital, and intermediate goods:
qj = ϕj (ij   fj )
ij =
1
Mj
 
1
η

Lj
θL
θL  Kj
θK
θK !η  C Ij
1  η
!1 η
C Ij =
 
∑
i
Z Mi
0
c Iij (ωi )
ε 1
ε dωi
! ε
ε 1
1 = θL + θK
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Setup - Government
I adopt a simple formulation of subsidy policy to allow for a transparent analysis
Governments are assumed to maximize the common component of worker utility
Subsidies are given to all local rms to pay for a fraction of their overall costs
These local cost subsidies are nanced with local lump-sum taxes on consumers
E Fi = wiLi + λ
L
i rK   si

wiLi + rKi + E
I
i

 Ωi
Short
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Equilibrium - Solution
For given subsidies, consumers maximize utility, rms maximize prots, rms make zero prots,
and markets clear
The solution of the model can be expressed as a system of 3R equilibrium conditions in the
3R unknowns λLi ,λ
K
i ,Pi
However, this system depends on a large number of parameters which are hard to estimate
including τij , ϕi , fi ,Ai
I circumvent this di¢ culty by expressing the equilibrium conditions in changes using "exact
hat algebra" techniques
I only need Tij ,λ
L
i , si and θ
L , θK , η, ε, σ and compute counterfactuals from a benchmark which
matches Tij ,λ
L
i , si
Conditions
Ralph Ossa (U of C) Subsidy Competition April 2015 10 / 32
Equilibrium - Exact hat algebra
Proof.
Pj =
 
∑
i
Mi (pi τij )
1 ε
! 1
1 ε
P 0j
Pj
=
 
∑
i
Mi (pi τij )
1 ε (Pj )ε 1 Ej
∑m Mm (pmτmj )
1 ε (Pj )ε 1 Ej
M 0i
Mi

p 0i
pi
1 ε! 11 ε
Tij = Mi (pi τij )
1 ε (Pj )ε 1 Ej
Pˆj =
 
∑
i
Tij
∑m Tmj
Mˆi (pˆi )
1 ε
! 1
1 ε
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Equilibrium - Isomorphism
Agglomeration forces: Consumers want to be close to rms and rms want to be close to
rms to take advantage of lower prices
Dispersion forces: Consumers have heterogeneous preferences over locations but there are no
local xed factors such as housing
The model is isomorphic to an Armington model with external IRS technology up to the scale
of ϕi if φ =
1
ε 1 and technology is
qi = ϕi (Ii )
1+φ
Ii =
 
1
η

Li
θL
θL  Ki
θK
θK !η  C Ii
1  η
!1 η
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Data - Sources
2007 Commodity Flow Survey
Tij Map
New York Times Business Incentives Database
s¯i = 0.7%, smini = 0.0% (NV), s
max
i = 5.4% (VT) Map
2007 Bureau of Economic Analysis Input-Output Table
θL = 0.57, θK = 0.43, η = 0.58
2007 Annual Survey of Manufacturing
λLi
Map
Obereld and Raval (2014)
ε = 4
Equilibrium conditions
λKi , Ωi Details
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Data - Adjustments
I purge the trade data of the net exports due to transfers in order to avoid having to take a
stance on the units in which they are held xed
For this calculation, I work with a version of the model without labor mobility so that all
adjustments come from wage changes and capital ows Details
I also introduce a federal subsidy on intermediate purchases in order to be able to focus on
the beggar-thy-neighbor aspects of state subsidies Details
pij =
ε
ε  1

(wi )
θL (r )θ
K η  
ρIPi
1 η
ρi τij
ϕi
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East and West - Multiplicity of equilibria
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Full sample - Assuming uniqueness and stability
I choose σ  1.5 to make sure that the factual equilibrium is unique and stable Example
I determine this threshold by trying out a large number of random guesses and subsidy shocks
The lower σ, the more equilibria appear, involving extreme agglomeration in reasonable states
I do not attempt to estimate σ but consider various values capturing di¤erent time horizons
Serrato and Zidar (2014) estimate σ = 0.7 but also include housing as another dispersion force
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Welfare e¤ects of subsidy - Example
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Welfare e¤ects of subsidy - Decomposition
Under certain restrictions, the welfare e¤ects resulting from small subsidy changes can be
decomposed into:
dUj
Uj
=
1
η
1
ε  1 ∑i
Tij
Ej
dMi
Mi| {z }
home market e¤ect
+
1
η ∑i
Tij
Ej

dpj
pj
  dpi
pi

| {z }
terms-of-trade e¤ect
Moreover, price changes depend on subsidy changes, wage changes, and price index changes
so that:
dToTj
ToTj
= θL
R
∑
i=1
Tij
Ej

dwj
wj
  dwi
wi

| {z }
relative wage e¤ect
+
1
η
R
∑
i=1
Tij
Ej
 
dρj
ρj
  dρi
ρi
!
| {z }
direct subsidy e¤ect
+
1  η
η
R
∑
i=1
Tij
Ej

dPj
Pj
  dPi
Pi

| {z }
intermediate cost e¤ect
For example, if IL unilaterally imposes a 5 percent subsidy, the approximate welfare e¤ects
are:
U HME TOT TOTw TOTρ TOTP
IL 4.7% 3.1% 1.6% 6.8% -4.6% -0.6%
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Optimal subsidies
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Optimal subsidies - Maximizing employment
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Optimal subsidies - Welfare e¤ects
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Optimal subsidies IL - Geography of welfare e¤ects
Welfare effects resulting from optimal subsidy imposed by IL
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Optimal subsidies - Sensitivity
Sensitivity wrt ε
ε s ∆U ∆λL
avg. own other avg.
4.0 13.0% 12.9% -0.8% 8.6%
4.5 11.0% 6.2% -0.4% 4.2%
5.0 9.6% 3.8% -0.2% 2.6%
5.5 8.6% 2.6% -0.1% 1.8%
6.0 7.7% 1.9% -0.1% 1.3%
6.5 7.1% 1.4% -0.1% 1.0%
Sensitivity wrt σ
σ s ∆U ∆λL
avg. own other avg.
1.5 13.0% 12.9% -0.8% 8.6%
3.0 12.6% 8.3% -0.5% 2.8%
4.5 12.5% 7.5% -0.5% 1.7%
6.0 12.4% 7.1% -0.4% 1.2%
7.5 12.4% 6.9% -0.4% 0.9%
9.0 12.4% 6.8% -0.4% 0.8%
Short
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Nash subsidies
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Nash subsidies - Welfare e¤ects
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Nash subsidies - Geography of welfare e¤ects
Welfare effects of Nash subsidies
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Nash subsidies - Sensitivity
Sensitivity wrt ε
ε s ∆U ∆λL
4.0 11.8% -2.3% 0.9%
4.5 10.3% -1.3% 0.6%
5.0 9.1% -0.8% 0.5%
5.5 8.2% -0.5% 0.4%
6.0 7.5% -0.3% 0.3%
6.5 6.9% -0.2% 0.3%
Sensitivity wrt σ
σ s ∆U ∆λL
1.5 11.8% -2.3% 0.9%
3.0 11.6% -2.3% 0.4%
4.5 11.5% -2.3% 0.2%
6.0 11.5% -2.3% 0.2%
7.5 11.5% -2.3% 0.1%
9.0 11.5% -2.3% 0.1%
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Cooperative subsidies
Governments follow a bargaining process resembling symmetric Nash bargaining: max
fs ,Ωg
Uˆ1 s.t.
Uˆ1 = Uˆi 8 i and ∑i Ωi = 0
Cooperative subsidies are always zero while cooperative transfers vary depending on the starting
point to ensure Uˆ1 = Uˆi 8 i
Welfare increases by 3.9 percent starting at Nash subsidies and by 0.04 percent starting at
factual subsidies in all states
Cooperative subsidies would be 1/ε if the federal government did not subsidize intermediate
consumption at a rate 1/ε
Transfers and capital ows
Ralph Ossa (U of C) Subsidy Competition April 2015 28 / 32
Cooperative subsidies - Sensitivity
Sensitivity wrt ε
ε s ∆U ∆λL
4.0 0% 3.9% 0%
4.5 0% 2.4% 0%
5.0 0% 1.7% 0%
5.5 0% 1.2% 0%
6.0 0% 0.9% 0%
6.5 0% 0.7% 0%
Sensitivity wrt σ
σ s ∆U ∆λL
1.5 0% 3.9% 0%
3.0 0% 3.8% 0%
4.5 0% 3.7% 0%
6.0 0% 3.7% 0%
7.5 0% 3.7% 0%
9.0 0% 3.7% 0%
Starting at Nash eq.
Sensitivity wrt ε
ε s ∆U ∆λL
4.0 0% 0.04% 0%
4.5 0% 0.04% 0%
5.0 0% 0.03% 0%
5.5 0% 0.03% 0%
6.0 0% 0.03% 0%
6.5 0% 0.03% 0%
Sensitivity wrt σ
σ s ∆U ∆λL
1.5 0% 0.04% 0%
3.0 0% 0.04% 0%
4.5 0% 0.04% 0%
6.0 0% 0.04% 0%
7.5 0% 0.04% 0%
9.0 0% 0.04% 0%
Starting at factual eq.
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Observed vs. counterfactual subsidies
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Observed vs. counterfactual subsidy costs
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Conclusion
I analyze subsidy wars and subsidy talks among US states using a quantitative economic
geography model
I believe this is the rst quantitative analysis of noncooperative and cooperative policy in a
spatial environment
By using "exact hat algebra" techniques I move beyond the illustrative numerical examples
typical of the literature
My results still have to be interpreted with caution since I make many simplications in the
interest of transparency
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Solution - Equilibrium conditions in levels
E Fi = wiLi + λ
L
i rK   si

wiLi + rKi + ρ
IE Ii

  λLi s I
R
∑
m=1
E Im  Ωi
λLi = U
1
σ
i /
R
∑
j=1
U
1
σ
j
Ui = AiE
F
i / (LiPi )
wiLi =

θL/θK

rKi
E Ii =

(1  η) /ρI ηθK

rKi
pi =
ε
ε  1

(wi )
θL (r )θ
K η  
ρIi Pi
1 η
ρi
ϕi
1
ε
R
∑
j=1
(pi τij )
1 ε (Pj )ε 1

E Fj + E
I
j

=

(wi )
θL (r )θ
K η 
ρIPi
1 η
ρi fi
Mi =
Li
εfi ηθ
L
wi
(wi )
θL (r )θ
K η
(ρIPi )
1 η
Pj =
 
R
∑
i=1
Mi (pi τij )
1 ε
! 1
1 ε
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Solution - Equilibrium conditions in changes
Eˆ Fi =
wiLi
E Fi
wˆi λˆ
L
i +
λLi rK
E Fi
λˆ
L
i  
Si
E Fi
s 0i
 
wiLi
Si
wˆi λˆ
L
i +
rKi
Si
λˆ
K
i +
ρIE 0Ii
Si
Eˆ Ii
!
  S
I
i
E Fi
λˆ
L
i
R
∑
m=1
λKm Eˆ
I
m  
Ω0i
E Fi
λˆ
L
i =
 
Uˆi
 1
σ /
R
∑
j=1
λLj
 
Uˆj
 1
σ
Uˆi = Eˆ
F
i /

λˆ
L
i Pˆi

wˆi λˆ
L
i = λˆ
K
i
Eˆ Ii = λˆ
K
i
pˆi = (wˆi )
θLη  Pˆi 1 η ρˆi
R
∑
j=1
Tij
∑n Tin
 
Pˆj
ε 1  E Fj
Ej
Eˆ Fj +
E Ij
Ej
Eˆ Ij
!
= (pˆi )
ε
Mi =
Li
εfi ηθ
L
wi
(wi )
θL (r )θ
K η
(ρIPi )
1 η
Pˆj =
 
R
∑
i=1
Tij
∑m Tmj
Mˆi (pˆi )
1 ε
! 1
1 ε
Back
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Data - Self-reliance
Self-reliance as measured by own trade share
AL
AZ AR
CA CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL IN
IA
KS KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
% of imports
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Back
Ralph Ossa (U of C) Subsidy Competition April 2015 32 / 32
Data - Distribution of subsidies
Manufacturing subsidies
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Data - Distribution of manufacturing employment
Share of national manufacturing employment
AL
AZ AR
CA CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL IN
IA
KS KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
% of total
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Back
Ralph Ossa (U of C) Subsidy Competition April 2015 32 / 32
Data - Inference
The model links observed trade ows and unobserved capital incomes and capital shares
through the following equilibrium conditions:
rKi =
θK η
ρi
∑
n
Tin
λKi =
rKi
∑m rKm
The model also allows me to decompose net exports into an endogenous component and a
residual Ωj which I interpret as transfers:
∑
n
(Tjn   Tnj ) =

λKj   λLj

rK +Ωj
Back
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Adjustment I - Transfers
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Adjustment I - Transfers
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Adjustment I - Transfers
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Adjustment I - Transfers
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Adjustment I - Transfers
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Effects on predicted capital-labor ratios
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Adjustment II - Federal subsidy
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East and West - Stability of equilibria
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Multiplicity of equilibria - Agglomeration on West Coast
Alternative equilibrium share of national manufacturing employment (sigma=1)
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Multiplicity of equilibria - Agglomeration on West Coast
Associated employment change
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Multiplicity of equilibria- Agglomeration on East Coast
Alternative equilibrium share of national manufacturing employment (sigma=1)
AL
AZ AR
CA CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL IN
IA
KS KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WV
WI
WY
% of total
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Ralph Ossa (U of C) Subsidy Competition April 2015 32 / 32
Multiplicity of equilibria- Agglomeration on East Coast
Associated employment change
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Optimal subsidies - Determinants of own trade share
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Optimal subsidies - Determinants of own trade share
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Optimal subsidies - Decomposition of welfare e¤ects
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Optimal subsidies IL - Geography of labor reallocation
Worker flows resulting from optimal subsidy imposed by IL
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Optimal subsidies IL - Geography of capital reallocation
Capital flows resulting from optimal subsidy imposed by IL
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Nash subsidies - Geography of labor reallocation
Worker flows resulting from Nash subsidies
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Nash subsidies - Geography of capital reallocation
Capital flows resulting from Nash subsidies
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Cooperative subsidies - Transfers
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Cooperative subsidies - Transfers
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Cooperative subsidies - Geography of capital reallocation
Capital flows resulting from cooperation starting at Nash subsidies
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Cooperative subsidies - Geography of capital reallocation
Capital flows resulting from cooperation starting at factual subsidies
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